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ExTEndEd AbsTrACT
Research on how people’s feelings toward risky choices affect 
such choices has been of interest in the past 30 years (Loewenstein et 
al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2004). We draw upon two streams of research 
on affect regarding non-risky choices and apply them to risky ones. 
One stream suggests that people take actions to balance or repair 
their feelings, known as “affect regulation” (Manucia, Baumann, and 
Cialdini 1984; Isen 1987), while another stream suggests that people 
use their feelings as informational input, known as “affect-as-input” 
(Mayer et al. 1992; Schwarz and Clore 1983). We extrapolate these 
two streams’ predictions regarding non-risky choices to make predic-
tions regarding risky choices.
People who regulate their feelings make choices that produce 
a favourable affective outcome. They thus aim to avoid negative 
outcomes. Over risky gains, which produce positive feelings about 
possible benefits from taking risks, they avoid risks to prevent losses 
from accruing and to keep their feelings “in check”. Similarly, over 
risky losses, which produce negative feelings about possible dangers, 
they would avoid risks for the same reason. By taking risks but los-
ing, the counterfactual that they could have won with certainty would 
be unfavourable. As such, we predict that people who regulate their 
feelings fear the worst possible outcome that could come from tak-
ing risks – over both gain and loss domains. Meanwhile, people who 
use their feelings use them as a sign about possible directions to take. 
Positive feelings signal that “everything is okay” but negative ones 
signal that “something is wrong”. Over risky gains, they consider 
positive feelings toward possible benefits as a sign that they can ac-
crue possible gains, suggesting risk-seeking. Over risky losses, they 
consider their negative feelings toward possible dangers as a sign 
that something needs to be done to avoid possible losses, again sug-
gesting risk-taking. As such, we predict that people who use their 
feelings hope for the possible outcome that could come from taking 
risks – over both gain and loss domains.
Five experiments support our hypothesis. In Experiments 1A 
and 1B, we primed participants to regulate or use their feelings by 
having them think affectively or analytically, respectively (Hsee and 
Rottenstreich 2004). Participants primed to regulate their feelings 
preferred the certain option in the Asian disease problem (Experi-
ment 1A; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) and were more likely to sell 
their shares in a hypothetical stock scenario in the disposition effect 
(Experiment 1B) than participants primed to use their feelings. These 
findings were consistent over both gain and loss domains (Experi-
ment 1A; Figure 1) and whether the stock portfolio increased or de-
creased (Experiment 1B; Figure 2).
In Experiment 2, we used a different manipulation of regulating 
and using feelings. People thinking concretely regulate their feelings, 
while people thinking abstractly use them, due to the affective feed-
back loop that exists in concrete but not abstract mindsets (Kivetz 
and Kivetz, forthcoming). We thus primed participants with a con-
crete or abstract mindset. In a hypothetical gamble between winning 
$500 and a 50% chance of winning $1,000, or between losing $500 
and a 50% chance of losing $1,000, participants primed to regulate 
their feelings prefer the certain option more over both gain and loss 
domains than participants primed to use their feelings (Figure 3).
Experiments 3 and 4 shed light on the hypothesized emphasis 
on fear and hope from regulating or using feelings, respectively. In 
Experiment 3, we measured participants’ tendencies to regulate or 
use their feelings using the Negative Mood Regulation scale (NMR; 
Catanzaro and Mearns 1990). Participants took part in a hypotheti-
cal lottery similar to Experiment 2. However, before they made their 
choices, they wrote about what they would do and feel if they either 
“win” or “lose” by taking the risky option. Findings replicated those 
from Experiment 2. Participants who regulated their feelings wrote 
about the worst possible outcome, while those who used their feel-
ings wrote about the best possible outcome – again, over both gain 
and loss domains. This suggests an emphasis on fear and hope, re-
spectively.
Finally, Experiment 4 used a word-association task to measure 
participants’ tendencies to regulate or use their feelings. First, par-
ticipants wrote down the first word that came to mind in response to 
negatively-valenced words such as cancer. Then, they wrote down 
words in response to neutral words such as chair. We coded respons-
es on this second task as either positive or negative, as a proxy for 
regulating or using feelings. Participants indicated their subjective 
happiness towards winning or losing a series of money from $100 
to $1,000. We fitted a regression model in each gain/loss domain 
for participants who regulated/used their feelings, and included the 
squared subjective happiness to assess the second-order curvature 
of participants’ utility curves (Figure 4). Participants who regulated 
their feelings had concave curves, while those who used their feel-
ings had convex curves. These findings suggest risk-aversion and 
risk-seeking, respectively, over both gain and loss domains.
This research suggests that people who regulate their feelings 
are risk-averse while those who use them are risk-seeking over both 
gain and loss domains. This is likely due to the emphasis on fear or 
hope from taking risks, as Experiments 3 and 4 suggest. We offer 
an implication for prospect theory: people are risk-averse over gains 
because they regulate their feelings, but people are risk-seeking over 
losses because they use those feelings. Our findings bridge research 
distinguishing between affect regulation and affect-as-input, with 
that on risky decision-making. Our findings also encourage future 
research to focus more on anticipated than current feelings. That is, 
they should emphasize the “prospect” in prospect theory.
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